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ABSTRACT
In the current age of information and big data, consumer
informational privacy has become an important issue in mar-
keting. Besides being worried about the growing collection,
storage, and use of personal information, consumers are
anxious about a lack of transparency or control over their
personal data. Despite these growing concerns, understand-
ing of how firms’ privacy practices affect consumers remains
limited. We review the relevant literature on consumer
privacy from a marketing perspective and summarize current
knowledge about how information collection, information
storage, information use, transparency, and control influence
consumers’ behavior. In addition, we discuss to what extent
the influence of firms’ privacy practices differs between firms,
consumers, and environments. On the basis of this knowl-
edge, we formulate several hypotheses aimed at providing
direction for future research regarding the role of consumer
informational privacy in marketing.
Frank T. Beke, Felix Eggers and Peter C. Verhoef (2018), “Consumer Informational
Privacy: Current Knowledge and Research Directions”, Foundations and TrendsR© in
Marketing: Vol. 11, No. 1, pp 1–71. DOI: 10.1561/1700000057.
1
Introduction
We are living in the age of information. Since firms started to realize
that data could generate value for them and for their customers, they
began collecting, storing, and using more data (or information) about
consumers. Every year 16.1 trillion gigabytes of data are recorded,
and forecasts are that this will grow to 163 trillion gigabytes by 2025
(Reinsel et al., 2017). Consumer data allow firms to better understand
their customers and provide products and services that better match
consumers’ need and preferences. Customer relationship management,
customer intelligence, and, more recently, one-to-one marketing have all
emerged by virtue of collecting information (Rust and Huang, 2014).
However, controversial revelations regarding the expansion of infor-
mation collection and privacy in general (e.g., Edward Snowden’s
disclosures about data collection and surveillance programs) has resulted
in a worldwide surge of privacy concern. In the United States, 92%
of consumers worry about their online privacy (TRUSTe, 2016), while
globally 57% of consumers were more concerned about their privacy
compared to last year (CIGI-Ipsos, 2017). These concerns could deter
consumers from accepting information collection, which matters even
more in times in which privacy legislation and technological innovations —
2
3such as cookie blockers and privacy-protective browsers — provide
consumers more control over their privacy. For example, a recent
study by Pew Research shows that 60% of consumers have chosen
to not install an app when the collection of information was considered
excessive, while 43% have uninstalled an app after finding out about
excessive information collection (Olmstead and Atkinson, 2015). Even
when consumers might not immediately abandon firms that neglect
privacy it could result in bad publicity and a loss of trust in case
consumers find out about the collection, storage, and use of information
afterwards. For example, when consumers became aware Samsung was
recording all interactions with their “smart” TVs, criticism went as far
as accusing Samsung of spying on their customers (Forbes, 2015). Given
the importance of information for firms, understanding how privacy
affects consumers, and, more specifically, when and why consumers
accept or reject the collection, storage, and use of information, has
become crucial for the field of marketing (Wedel and Kannan, 2016;
Montgomery and Smith, 2009).
Despite the growing attention for privacy, the understanding of
how firms’ privacy practices affect consumers and their relationships
with firms is in its infancy. As privacy is an interdisciplinary topic,
the knowledge about privacy and information disclosure is dispersed
across scientific domains, ranging from social psychology to information
systems and public policy. Within marketing, privacy has mainly been
studied in the direct or interactive marketing literature (Culnan, 1995;
Nowak and Phelps, 1995; Milne and Boza, 1999; Schoenbachler and
Gordon, 2002; Phelps et al., 2000; Milne and Gordon, 1993), as part
of service quality (Parasuraman et al., 2005; Wolfinbarger and Gilly,
2003), or, more recently, in the literature on online advertising (Tucker,
2014; Bleier and Eisenbeiss, 2015a; Schumann et al., 2014; Goldfarb
and Tucker, 2011a). Although Peltier et al. (2009) and Martin and
Murphy (2017) have provided a global overview on the role of privacy
within marketing, due to their broad focus the specific understanding
of how firms’ privacy practices affect consumers need to be elaborated.
While Lanier and Saini (2008) address part of this void by discussing
(some) firm-related privacy issues, we believe a more structured overview
focused on the influence of firms’ privacy practices on consumers is
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necessary. Specifically, firms need a more detailed understanding of when
and why consumers are (un)willing to disclose information and how
a firm’s privacy strategy affects the relationship with their customers,
such as when customers might consider switching to a competing firm.
We therefore focus on how firms’ privacy practices have an impact on
consumers, their privacy concerns, and the exchange of information.
Our objective of this paper is twofold. First, we use current knowl-
edge about privacy and information disclosure to outline the main
empirical findings regarding the influence of firms’ privacy practices on
consumers’ behavior.1 In doing so, we also discuss how the influence of
firms’ privacy practices on consumers differs between firms, consumers,
and contexts. Second, drawing on current knowledge we identify areas
in need of further research and formulate hypotheses for them. We start
by conceptualizing consumer informational privacy and then derive a
conceptual framework, which guides the subsequent sections.
1.1 Conceptualization of consumer informational privacy
In light of the rise of photography and growing circulation of newspapers
at the beginning of the 20th century, legal scholars Warren and Brandeis
(1890) stressed the importance of privacy as “the right to be let alone.”
Besides preventing others from intruding an individual’s personal sphere,
such as their house, they also stated that every individual should be
protected against improper publications. While the initial focus was on
others being physically present in someone’s personal sphere (physical
privacy), the growing collection, storage, and use of personal informa-
tion2 has shifted the attention to informational privacy (Goodwin, 1991;
Rust et al., 2002; Mason, 1986). Informational privacy intrusion relates
to others monitoring and recording an individual’s behavior, and thus
to the collection and storage of information, without necessarily being
physically present. Meanwhile, protection from improper publications
1Given our focus on empirical findings we exclude papers describing economic
models (for an overview, see Acquisti et al., 2016) or exploring the influence of public
policy on firms (Miller and Tucker, 2009; Adjerid et al., 2016).
2In line with recent legislation, we consider personal information to be all
information that can be attributed to one individual (General Data Protection
Regulation (EU), 2016).
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relates to how the information is being used. The growing importance
of consumer information directs the focus throughout this paper to
informational privacy of consumers, to which we will simply refer to as
privacy.
There has been much discussion on how privacy should be defined.
Some scholars have suggested that privacy is context-specific so that it
cannot be generally defined (Martin and Murphy, 2017; Pavlou, 2011;
Smith et al., 2011). This literature stream has proposed to focus on
harmful activities using information instead (Prosser, 1960; Solove,
2006), whereby context-specific norms determine whether activities are
harmful and thus violate privacy (Nissenbaum, 2004). Despite these
suggestions, we follow the juridical standpoint that privacy is matter of
autonomy and control over the collection, storage, and use of information
(Westin, 1967; Altman, 1975; Petronio, 1991; Stone et al., 1983; Smith
et al., 1996; Malhotra et al., 2004). Recent privacy laws and guidelines
in the United States and the European Union have also adopted this
standpoint on privacy, as they aim to let consumers decide for themselves
what happens with their information. This implies that privacy is only
violated when information is collected, stored, or used against the
consumer’s will. Consumers’ effective control depends on being aware
of and having the ability to influence the collection, storage, and use of
information (Goodwin, 1991; Foxman and Kilcoyne, 1993; Caudill and
Murphy, 2000). Therefore, in the context of firms and consumers we
define privacy as the extent to which a consumer is aware of and has the
ability to control the collection, storage, and use of personal information
by a firm. Thus, if firms want to respect consumers’ privacy they should
explain what information they collect, how they store the information,
and for which purposes they will use the information (transparency).
Moreover, firms should allow consumers to prevent firms from collecting
information, to have them discard information, and to prohibit them
from using their information (control).
Across a wide range of disciplines, ranging from social psychology
to information systems and, more recently, marketing, there has been
a debate about what privacy is and what privacy is not (Smith et al.,
2011; Spärck Jones, 2003). Because privacy is contingent on control,
knowingly disclosing information or accepting information collection
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is not a violation or deterioration of privacy. This implies that, unlike
prior suggestions (Rust et al., 2002; Posner, 1981; Posner, 1978), we
consider privacy not the same as concealing or withholding information.
Although related, privacy is also not the equivalent of security, as that
implies that (unknown) outsiders illegally — that is, without proper
authorization — intercept or access information (Belanger et al., 2002;
Martin et al., 2017; Hoffman et al., 1999). Given that information is
collected, stored, or used without consumers knowingly consenting when
security fails, security can be considered as one requirement for ensuring
privacy and will be treated as such.
1.2 Conceptual framework
Figure 1.1 presents our conceptual framework, which guides our dis-
cussion of the literature. We will discuss how firms’ privacy prac-
tices, which encompasses the way firms handle the information and
privacy of consumers, affects consumers’ attitudes, intentions, and
behavior. Specifically, we discern five privacy practices that matter to
consumers: information collection, information storage, information use,
transparency, and (consumer) control. Understanding when consumers
withhold (or falsify) information, reject information collection, or even
refuse to interact or transact with a particular firm owing to its privacy
practices has become crucial for managers. Moreover, firms need to
know how consumers are affected when confronted with the storage
and use of personal information, through marketing communication or
location-based services.
Consumers’ attitudes or perceptions with regard to privacy, such
as privacy concern, often mediate the effect of firms’ privacy practices
on consumers’ intentions or behavior. Therefore, many studies have
used these attitudes or perceptions either as proxies for firms’ privacy
practices (predictor) or as surrogates for consumer behavior (outcome).
What complicates matters is that the influence of firms’ privacy practices
on consumers could differ between firms, consumers, and environments.
For example, consumers accept the collection of medical information
more easily when done by healthcare providers (firms), when being in



















perfect medical condition (consumers), or when privacy is regulated
(environment).
To explain the influence of firms’ privacy practices on consumer
behavior, most studies have focused on the construct of privacy concern.
Although conceptualized and operationalized in various ways, privacy
concern always captures consumers’ perceptions (or attitudes) of how
the collection, storage, and use of personal information, or (lack of)
transparency or control, negatively affect them (Smith et al., 1996;
Malhotra et al., 2004). Whereas the collection, storage, and use of
personal information matter due to the negative consequences consumers
may endure (distributive fairness), social contract theory suggests
that transparency and control also matter as consumers also take
the procedures and interpersonal treatment (procedural fairness) into
account (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994). The importance of transparency
and control is also established in reactance theory, which proposes that
consumers resist being restricted in their choices (Brehm, 1966). In the
context of privacy this implies that consumers will respond positively
(negatively) when they believe firms are (not) transparent and provide
(no) control over the collection, storage, and use of personal information
(Culnan and Bies, 2003; Son and Kim, 2008). Besides privacy concern,
Table 1.1 provides an overview of related constructs scholars have used
to capture consumers’ worries or uneasiness (attitudes and perceptions),
such as privacy risk (Featherman et al., 2010), perceived privacy (Dinev
et al., 2013), information sensitivity (Mothersbaugh et al., 2012), intru-
siveness (Li et al., 2002; Burgoon et al., 1989), and vulnerability (Martin
et al., 2017).
Prior work has applied various theoretical frameworks to explain why
consumers disclose information despite being concerned. Consumers’
ability to protect their own privacy (protection motivation theory)
(Rogers, 1975; Youn, 2009), or their trust in specific firms (Morgan and
Hunt, 1994; Wirtz and Lwin, 2009) might diminish consumers’ concerns
in a specific context. More recently the rationale that consumers look
beyond the negative outcomes (concerns), and also take the positive
outcomes of the collection, storage, and use of personal information
into account, has taken root. Being closely related to social exchange
theory (Homans, 1958; Premazzi et al., 2010) and expectancy theory
1.2. Conceptual framework 9
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(1989)
Vulnerability Perception of susceptibility to harm




(Vroom, 1964; Hann et al., 2007), the privacy calculus suggests that
consumers determine for themselves whether they regard the conse-
quences of the collection, storage, and use of personal information to be
beneficial (providing benefits) or detrimental (incurring costs or risks)
in a specific situation (Laufer and Wolfe, 1977; Culnan and Armstrong,
1999; Dinev and Hart, 2006). These consequences can be tangible (e.g.,
monetary discount) or intangible (e.g., uncomfortable feeling), and
have been explained using more generic theoretical frameworks, such
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as the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) or the
technology acceptance model (Davis, 1989). The privacy calculus is
however considered as the “most useful framework” to understand the
acceptance of information collection (Culnan and Bies, 2003, p. 326).
Since the privacy calculus can accommodate most theoretical frameworks
it has seen many explicit or implicit applications (Mothersbaugh et al.,
2012; Premazzi et al., 2010; Dinev and Hart, 2006; Xie et al., 2006),
and will serve as foundation for this review as well.
1.3 The privacy calculus and the privacy paradox
Despite the growing prominence of the privacy calculus, in some situa-
tions consumers’ privacy attitudes or perceptions are inconsistent with
their actual privacy-related behavior — a discrepancy that has been
termed the privacy paradox (Berendt et al., 2005; Norberg et al., 2007).
Researchers have offered various explanations for its existence (Acquisti
et al., 2015; Dinev et al., 2015). Besides that some part of consumer
behavior is inherently inconsistent or suffers from bounded rationality
(Ariely, 2009), consumers’ privacy concerns are seldom triggered. Espe-
cially in low-involvement situations, such as when consumers search
online or use their mobile phone, the influence of biases and heuristics
can be strong (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Chaiken, 1980). In other
instances, consumers are unable to respond because they are unaware
that information is being collected or used (Acquisti and Grossklags,
2005b), lack the ability to control firms’ privacy practices (Turow et al.,
2009), or have no suitable alternatives.
Apart from irrational behavior or situations in which consumers
are unaware or unable to exert control, the privacy paradox has also
been a measurement issue. Given that consumers’ privacy preferences
are strongly influenced by situational or contextual characteristics
(Nissenbaum, 2004), when and for which context privacy concern is
measured matters — that is, privacy concern with regard to a specific
technology (e.g., the Internet), a specific firm (e.g., Google), or a specific
situation (e.g., when searching for a product). Moreover, benefits have
either been ignored, measured incompletely, or using only very generic
measures (e.g., Xu et al., 2009; Xu et al., 2011). In addition, the
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consequences (benefits and costs) of the collection, storage, and use of
information are not always immediate and definite (Brandimarte et al.,
2013), which suggests that the perceived probability of consequences
should be taken into account (Risk Theory, Bauer, 1960; Conchar et
al., 2004). So we suggest that consumers’ acceptance of the collection,
storage, and use of personal information is best explained by their
context-specific perception of the benefits and costs, taking into account
transparency, control, and the uncertainty of these benefits and costs.
Hypothesis 1: Consumers’ acceptance of the collection, storage, and
use of personal information is best explained by their context-specific
perception of the benefits and costs, taking into account transparency,
control, and the uncertainty of these benefits and costs.
2
Information Collection
2.1 Type and amount of information
Nowadays, firms collect more information about their consumers than
ever before. In general, the more information firms demand, the less
willing consumers are inclined to provide them (Hui et al., 2007). Con-
sumers feel more vulnerable when firms have access to more information
(more risk), which leads them to provide erroneous information, initiate
negative word of mouth, or even switch firms (Martin et al., 2017).
Firms collect information about consumers’ online behavior (e.g.,
click-stream data, social media), oﬄine behavior (e.g., transaction
records, location data), and information needed for interactions or
transactions (e.g., contact information, financial state). Consumers
are affected by “what” firms want to collect, as they rather disclose
lifestyle or purchasing habits than financial or medical information
(Mothersbaugh et al., 2012; Premazzi et al., 2010; Lwin et al., 2007).
Consumers disclose less information when they consider information to
be sensitive (Brandimarte et al., 2013; Acquisti et al., 2012; John et al.,
2011), with sensitivity increasing when the potential for loss (or risk)
becomes greater (Mothersbaugh et al., 2012). More recent work has
shown that different types of information (e.g., financial information,
12
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medical information) can result in different types of losses (e.g., monetary
loss, social loss) (Milne et al., 2017). Therefore, consumers may consider
information as sensitive for various reasons. For example, disclosing
embarrassing information (e.g., sexual fantasies) might result in a loss of
face, while disclosing identifiable information (e.g., name) might result
in a loss of anonymity (White, 2004). Understanding which types of
information result in which types of losses, and which loss is considered
most troublesome, would help firms mitigate consumers’ concerns.
2.2 Information collection method
Besides what firms collect, also how they collect information matters.
Digitalization has radically changed the way firms collect information
about consumers. Rather than collecting information in person firms
nowadays primarily gather information via computers or other infor-
mation systems. Consumers respond positively when information is
collected by computers rather than humans, such as employees (Schwaig
et al., 2013), as without humans involved consumers have a sense
of anonymity (Tourangeau and Yan, 2007). Another consequence of
digitalization has been that consumers have to decide whether they
accept that firms collect information about them automatically rather
than actively disclosing information themselves, for example, via forms.
This shift makes the collection of information less visible, which could
amplify the privacy paradox. Moreover, it has started to give consumers
the feeling information is being collected behind their backs (Acquisti
and Grossklags, 2005b), which could result in a backlash when consumers
eventually learn that firms have collected their information without
notifying them — that is, without transparency (see Section 5).
A recent development with regard to how firms collect information
has been that, besides active and passive information collection, firms
have increasingly begun to rely on making inferences about consumers.
For example, firms could estimate consumers’ income level based on
prior purchases or search history. Despite that most (data-driven) firms
make these inferences, and that such information could generate value
for firms and their customers, consumers have, in the past, indicated
opposition to inferred information (Culnan, 1993). Whether this is
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generalizable and what the underlying reason(s) are remains unclear.
One issue could be that because inferences are not factual information,
consumers fear they might be inaccurate. This fear might be mitigated
in the future with more widespread implementations of increasingly
accurate machine-learning techniques and consumers’ experiences with
the inferences made. Moreover, making inferences might indicate that
firms are hesitant to ask consumers for this information directly, which
suggests the information is either sensitive or potentially negative in
its effects on consumers. Finally, consumers might oppose inferences
because they lack any control over when and which inferences firms
make.
Hypothesis 2: Consumers oppose firms generating information by
making inferences because (1) inferences might be inaccurate, (2) infer-
ences might affect consumers negatively, or (3) they consider making
inferences to be unfair.
2.3 Online vs. Oﬄine behavior
Besides that digitalization enables firms to closely monitor how con-
sumers behave online, more recently mobile phones and other smart
devices have provided firms with access to information regarding con-
sumers’ oﬄine behavior. In the past, consumers have indicated to worry
more about their oﬄine identity (real life) than about their digital
identity (virtual life) (Acquisti and Grossklags, 2005a). For example,
when Google initially announced they would start monitoring consumers’
oﬄine behavior via their “smart” home device, consumers expressed their
concerns (Huffington Post, 2017). Therefore, consumers are expected to
be reluctant towards firms monitoring how they behave in stores (e.g.,
via RFID), on the road (e.g., via GPS), or in their own home (e.g., via
a “smart” home device). If firms want to deal with this reluctance they
need more insights as to when and why this is the case.
Contextual integrity and the influence of context-specific norms
(Nissenbaum, 2004) provide a reasonable explanation for consumers’
reluctance towards allowing firms to monitor their oﬄine behavior. The
norm (and law) in most countries is that consumers should be able
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to behave without others continuously watching over their shoulder,
especially in consumers’ personal sphere, such as their home. Consumers
might not feel comfortable when firms monitor and record socially
sensitive behavior, such as going to the bathroom.
Hypothesis 3: Consumers are more reluctant to let firms collect
information about their oﬄine behavior compared to online behavior,
predominantly because consumers expect they can behave freely (i.e.,
without firms monitoring them) in their personal sphere, such as at
home.
However, as the “virtual life” and “real life” are becoming less
distinct, consumers have become less reluctant to firms monitoring their
oﬄine behavior. In fact, 44% of the US adults are planning to purchase
a “smart” home device in 2018 (CTA, 2017). Future research should
address why consumers have become less reluctant — for example if
consumers have become more convinced of the benefits of firms using
information about oﬄine behavior (see Section 4). Moreover, growing
acceptance of collecting oﬄine information could also be a consequence
of a different firm, with a better reputation, offering the service (see
Section 7) or a change in generations (see Section 8).
2.4 Monetary compensation and other persuasion methods
Without changing the what and the how of information collection, and
in line with the privacy calculus, firms have convinced consumers to
disclose information by compensating them with additional benefits or
monetary incentives. Some of these benefits are linked to information
use, such as the ability to personalize products or services (see Section 4).
Also unrelated incentives, such as discount vouchers or access to free
content, can persuade consumers to disclose information (Premazzi et
al., 2010; Hui et al., 2007) or let firms track their behavior (Acquisti
et al., 2013; Derikx et al., 2016). Preliminary evidence suggests that
monetary compensation gives consumers the feeling that they are
selling their information, so they expect less control and allow firms
to use the information any way they like (Gabisch and Milne, 2014).
The attractiveness of monetary benefits is also reflected in consumers’
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adoption of loyalty programs. Multiple studies have shown that although
consumers are worried about their privacy, discounts and other monetary
benefits convince them to adopt loyalty programs nonetheless (Dorotic
et al., 2012; Demoulin and Zidda, 2009; Leenheer et al., 2007).
However, providing monetary compensation becomes less effective
when the risks of sharing information become higher — an effect that
depends on both the amount and the type of information. Moreover,
preliminary evidence suggests that insufficient monetary compensation
could arouse consumers’ privacy concern (Andrade et al., 2002), and
that monetary compensation could deter consumers from disclosing
information when the information is incongruent with the products
and services of the firm (Li et al., 2010). Therefore, firms have to
be cautious when offering a monetary compensation, as we expect
that its effectiveness depends on the amount and type of information
firms want to collect. Future research should clarify the boundary
conditions for monetary compensation, and should assess to what extent
the effectiveness of monetary compensation differs between firms and
consumers.
Hypothesis 4: Monetary compensation becomes less effective (or even
detrimental) for increasing consumers’ willingness to disclose information
when firms want to collect (1) more information, (2) more sensitive
information, or (3) incongruent information.
Besides monetary compensation, there are other ways for firms to
persuade consumers to disclose information. For example, consumers
disclose more information in unprofessional environments in which
privacy is triggered less (John et al., 2011), and, driven by comparative
judgment, they disclose more when they believe other consumers have
disclosed similar information (Acquisti et al., 2012). Similarly, when
computers disclose information first consumers reciprocate by also
disclosing information (Moon, 2000; Zimmer et al., 2010). Besides
these methods, we believe that firms could also persuade consumers to
accept information collection by collecting information in small steps.
Individuals do not always take in gradually increasing risks (Slovic,
2000), which suggests that firms could benefit from collecting less or less
sensitive information from consumers first before requesting more or
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more sensitive information. Although, in surveys, respondents provide
more answers when intrusive questions are asked first (Acquisti et
al., 2012), firms might be better off gradually increasing the amount
or the sensitivity of information requested, as otherwise they might





After collecting information about consumers, firms have to decide
how and where to store the information. One aspect that matters to
consumers is that unknown outsiders cannot gain unauthorized access to
their personal information (Smith et al., 1996). Therefore, information
storage relates closely to security. Over the past years, security breaches
have become more common. In 2016, US firms and government agencies
suffered over 1,000 security breaches, an increase of 40% compared to
the year before (Bloomberg, 2016). In the short term, these security
breaches have shown to negatively affect stock prices (Martin et al., 2017;
Acquisti et al., 2006; Cavusoglu et al., 2004; Malhotra and Kubowicz
Malhotra, 2011), with the negative effect becoming stronger when the
security breach becomes more severe, that is more victims or more data
leaked (Martin et al., 2017; Acquisti et al., 2006). Moreover, owing to
spillover effects, firms’ stock prices might decrease when competing
firms suffer a security breach, although a spillover effect reverses when
the security breach becomes more severe (Martin et al., 2017). However,
it should be noted that in the long term these security breaches seem to
have no effect on stock prices. While Malhotra and Kubowicz Malhotra
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(2011) found that 30 days after the announcement of a security breach
stock prices are still significantly lower, a more recent study shows that
after one or two years the security breach has no significant effect on
stock prices (Martin et al., 2017).
In addition to affecting stock prices, security breaches also directly
affect consumers by raising their general privacy concern (Smith et al.,
1996; Malhotra et al., 2004; Malhotra and Kubowicz Malhotra, 2011;
Bansal et al., 2015, see Section 8). Preliminary evidence suggests that
when confronted with a security breach consumers are also more inclined
to falsify information, commence in negative word-of-mouth, and even
switch firms (Martin et al., 2017).
Examining consumers’ behavioral reaction towards security breaches
in more detail, future research should assess how firms can diminish the
negative effect of security breaches. With regard to stock prices, the
adverse effect of a security breach was shown to be less severe when
a third party rather than the focal firm was held responsible or when
the security breach was caused by an accident rather than a deliberate
attack (Acquisti et al., 2006). Moreover, firms that are transparent about
their privacy practices and provide consumers with control over these
practices in general, even before outsiders gain unauthorized access,
suffer less from the impact of a security breach (Martin et al., 2017).
Whether these possibilities also affect the impact of a security breach
on the way consumers behave remains to be seen.
3.2 Safer storage
In line with risk theory (Peter and Tarpey, 1975), we believe firms
have two options for lowering the risk of security breaches. One is to
decrease the impact of security breaches for consumers by reducing the
potential loss for consumers, for example, by storing less or less sensitive
information. The impact of a security breach can also be diminished
by anonymizing or aggregating the information (Verhoef et al., 2016).
Anonymization requires that firms remove the link between a person and
that person’s information, by removing identifying information such as
name or e-mail address (Acquisti et al., 2016). Aggregation means that
information about consumers is stored at the group or segment level,
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which per definition implies that the information is anonymous. While
anonymization or aggregation ensures that individual consumers are not
harmed when information falls into the hands of unknown outsiders, the
downside is that it limits firms’ ability to create additional value using
the information (Schneider et al., 2017), although there are possibilities
to take full advantage of consumer information while simultaneously
protecting consumers’ privacy (Holtrop et al., 2017).
The alternative is to make security breaches less likely by decreasing
the likelihood of a negative event. Firms might store the information
for a shorter period, or assure consumers that their information is
collected and stored in a safe environment (Hann et al., 2007). For
example, Dutch telecom operator KPN tried to convince consumers
that its cloud services were less likely to result in privacy issues because
its servers were located in the Netherlands and thus fell under the
strict data protection regulation of the EU (BTG, 2012). While these
measures might diminish the likelihood of a security breach, the pledge
to store information in a safe environment only works when consumers
are convinced an environment is safer (Sutanto et al., 2013), and thus
believe that a privacy breach or violation is indeed less likely in that
environment. Future research should not only focus on examining how
information storage affects consumers in general, but also make more
specific what convinces consumers that information storage is safe.
Hypothesis 5: Consumers are more willing to let firms store informa-
tion when firms promise to store (1) less or less sensitive information,
(2) only anonymized or aggregated information, (3) information for a
shorter period, or (4) information in a safe environment.
4
Information Use
4.1 Aggregated level and individual level
Once collected and stored, firms use the information about consumers
for various purposes. As for the collection and storage of information,
the use of information only affects consumers when firms clearly inform
them as to how the information is used, or when the use of information
is evident to consumers. On an aggregated level, firms use consumer
information to monitor or optimize internal processes, or to enhance
their understanding of the needs and preferences of consumers in general
(Wedel and Kannan, 2016). Besides being less evident to consumers,
such information use has limited impact on consumers’ privacy because
it does not rely on personal information, and therefore the influence
on consumers is often negligible. Even when firms notify consumers
about using information on an aggregated level consumers are inclined
to accept as long as they consider it beneficial to themselves. As an
example, consumers accept the use of RFID tags in retail outlets when
firms use the information in order to reduce empty shelves (Smith et al.,
2014).
On an individual level, besides that firms need information about
consumers to deliver products or notify consumers about changes in their
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service, firms have begun using the information about consumers for
personalization. Personalization implies that firms tailor their offerings
of products and services to the needs and preferences of individual
consumers (Montgomery and Smith, 2009; Adomavicius and Tuzhilin,
2005), thereby increasing the relevance of their products and services.
The increasing digitalization enables firms to personalize their entire
marketing mix, allowing to individualize products or services, prices,
promotions, and places or locations (Rust and Huang, 2014). While
consumers might oppose personalization when (they believe) it puts
them at a disadvantage — that is, when they have to pay more or
receive inferior services compared to other consumers (Lacey et al.,
2007) — our focus will be on how privacy (concern) might affect the
approval of personalization (Rust and Huang, 2014; Montgomery and
Smith, 2009).
4.2 Personalization of product or service
To differentiate themselves from their competitors, firms continuously
search for ways to use information to augment their products and
services. For example, firms might remember contact details or payment
preferences to expedite the checkout (Acquisti and Varian, 2005). These
enhanced services benefit both firms and consumers — consumers
from more relevant products and services, firms from more loyal and
committed customers (Coelho and Henseler, 2012). Consumers are
more (less) inclined to show promotion-focused (prevention-focused)
behavior when firms use the information to personalize the website
interface (Wirtz and Lwin, 2009). Moreover, website morphing, which
entails personalizing websites to individual consumers, has a positive
effect on consumers’ purchases (Hauser et al., 2014). In addition,
consumers respond positively to personally recommended music (Chung
et al., 2009) and news (Chung et al., 2016). Besides personalized
recommendations, such as Amazon’s “recommended for you,” LinkedIN’s
“suggested connections,” or Netflix’ “selected for you,” more recently
consumers have also benefited from other forms of personalized content
or insights, such as Fitbit’s fitness insights or Siemens’s smart energy
meter.
4.3. Personalization of price 23
However, the growing personalization also has resulted in tension
between the relevance and the collection and use of (more) information.
Even when consumers are not always aware which information firms
need for these personalized services, the amount and type of information
needed affects consumers’ acceptance of personalization. More specif-
ically, consumers value personalized service less when it is based on
sensitive information (Mothersbaugh et al., 2012), and preliminary evi-
dence shows that for recommendation systems consumers only disclose
information when they expect valuable recommendations (Knijnenburg
and Kobsa, 2013). Moreover, while external information — such as
derived from social media — could improve personalization (Chung
et al., 2016), even in the context of scientific research many respondents
were hesitant to provide access to such information to improve product
recommendations (Heimbach et al., 2015). The context of search-and-
discovery services, such as FourSquare or Gowalla, provides further
evidence that consumers’ acceptance of personalized services depends
on which information is needed (Xie et al., 2014). In line with the
privacy calculus, consumers seemingly balance the positive and negative
consequences of personalized services. Future research should assess the
optimal balance between relevance and privacy, and study when and
for which consumers the benefits outweigh the costs.
4.3 Personalization of price
Besides personalized products or services, firms have begun providing
consumers personalized discounts or rewards, and even personalized
prices (Acquisti and Varian, 2005). Even though personalized promo-
tions might benefit firms (Zhang and Wedel, 2009; Khan et al., 2009),
consumers have shown to value personalized discounts less when based
on sensitive information — that is, discounts for embarrassing products
(White, 2004). Rather than being worried about their privacy, consumers
disapprove personalized pricing when they fail to understand why they
pay more than other consumers and consider it unfair when they receive
higher prices (Feinberg et al., 2002). Personalized prices rely mostly on
firms’ inferences about consumers’ willingness-to-pay instead of factual
information. In addition to the negative consequences of higher prices
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or fairness concerns, consumer might also worry about the accuracy
of the inferences (see Section 2.2). Preliminary evidence about firms
experimenting with personalized pricing (e.g., outrage over Amazon’s
variable pricing dropped their stock price by more than 13%, CNN,
2005) shows that firms can suffer from (future) backlash when consumers
find out that prices are consumer-specific.
4.4 Personalization of promotion
Although the personalization of online (banner) advertisements and
direct mailings to individual consumers has become standard practice,
consumers have shown mixed feelings towards the personalization
of marketing communication. While consumers consider personalized
marketing content more relevant and useful, thereby making banner
ads and direct mails more effective (Tucker, 2014; Bleier and Eisenbeiss,
2015a; Goldfarb and Tucker, 2011a; Aguirre et al., 2015; Van Doorn and
Hoekstra, 2013; Ansari and Mela, 2003; Bleier and Eisenbeiss, 2015b),
a majority of US consumers still rejects behavioral targeting (Purcell
et al., 2012).
Therefore, when confronted with banner ads and direct mails, too
much personalization makes marketing communication intrusive and
triggers privacy concerns (Li et al., 2002; Van Doorn and Hoekstra, 2013;
Edwards et al., 2002). As consumers become cognizant information is
collected and used, reactance theory suggests consumers are bothered
by a lack of control over the collection or use of information for
personalized marketing communication. Besides that ads become more
intrusive when they are cognitively intense or incongruent with the
website (Li et al., 2002; Edwards et al., 2002), intrusiveness is induced
when firms openly use detailed information about individual consumers
in their ads (Aguirre et al., 2015; Van Doorn and Hoekstra, 2013).
Targeting ads to an individual consumer (Tucker, 2014) or showing
the exact same product the consumer saw before, so-called dynamic
retargeting, also makes online ads less effective (Bleier and Eisenbeiss,
2015b; Lambrecht and Tucker, 2013), as consumers become aware that
personal information is being collected, stored, and used (Bleier and
Eisenbeiss, 2015b).
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As we will discuss in Section 5 (transparency) and Section 6 (control),
firms can conserve the effectiveness of personalized marketing commu-
nication by becoming more transparent with regard to its creation
(Aguirre et al., 2015) or by providing consumers more control over
information disclosure (Tucker, 2014). Moreover, firms could alter their
marketing communication to try and reduce the arousal of privacy
concerns. While not showing the exact same product twice (Bleier
and Eisenbeiss, 2015b; Lambrecht and Tucker, 2013) and increasing
the target audience of banner ads could prevent arousing privacy
concern (Tucker, 2014), it would also diminish the match with individual
consumers (and thus the effectiveness). In line with regulatory focus
theory (Higgins, 1997), a better solution would be to try and avoid
consumers getting into a prevention-focused state, and instead inducing
a more promotion-focused state, by increasing the relevance of marketing
communication. For example, personalizing online banner ads becomes
more effective when a banner ad is more relevant to the consumer
(Lambrecht and Tucker, 2013), and mobile ads become less intrusive
(and more effective) when these ads are relevant with regard to the
physical location of the consumer (Luo et al., 2014). This way, firms
might be able to alter the balance in favor of personalized marketing
communication.
Hypothesis 6: Firms can preserve effectiveness of personalized market-
ing communication by getting consumers in a more promotion-focused
state, for example, by making marketing communication, such as banner
ads and direct mail, more relevant.
4.5 Personalization of place or location
A recent development is that the rise of mobile devices enables firms
to personalize the location where they offer their products or services.
Location-based services tailor content to consumers’ physical location,
thereby providing consumers with the convenience of receiving content
at the right time and location (Xu et al., 2009; Xu et al., 2011; Zhao
et al., 2012). This content can range from location-specific information,
such as weather reports, to location-specific advertisements or mobile
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coupons. Given that location tracking has only recently gained attention,
few studies have assessed the acceptance of location-based products and
services.
However, as also discussed in Section 2, while consumers are vigilant
about firms tracking oﬄine behavior, a majority of consumers still rejects
location-based advertising (Urban and Hoofnagle, 2014). Therefore,
firms need a better understanding of the tension between relevance and
privacy in the context of location-based products and services. More
specifically, firms need to understand when consumers value the savings
in time or effort enough to offset their worries about firms tracking
their location. What seems to matter most to consumers is whether
the content firms provide is truly relevant to them, as the intention
to disclose information to location-based services is explained more by
the benefits (incentives, possibility to interact) than the costs (privacy
concern) (Zhao et al., 2012). Even more than online personalization
location-based services might give consumers the feeling they are being
followed and watched. Firms can prevent triggering such feelings by
making the information truly relevant, in terms of time and geographic
location (Luo et al., 2014), thereby bringing consumers in a more
promotion-focused state. Thus, as long as firms provide relevant content,
consumers are influenced less by negative feelings with regard to location
tracking.
4.6 Third-party sharing
Besides using information internally, firms can also generate revenue by
selling information or customer intelligence to other firms. Consumers
oppose sharing and selling information to unknown third parties (Alreck
and Settle, 2007), as they believe they are more at risk (Jai et al.,
2013), most likely because they do not know (transparency) or cannot
influence (control) how their information will be used. Moreover, third-
party firms typically have no incentive to provide consumers with any
suitable benefit in return. As a result, consumers respond negatively
to firms selling information, for example, by complaining, refusing
information disclosure, or avoiding marketing communication, whereas
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their long-term commitment and loyalty are enhanced when firms refuse
to sell information to third parties (Wirtz and Lwin, 2009). Although
firms could try and appease consumers’ concerns, for example, by
disseminating information with less detail, the issue is that this decreases
the potential benefit of information sharing (Schneider et al., 2017).
5
Transparency
5.1 Effect on consumers
Over the past decades, pressure from legislators and consumer protection
commissions has coerced firms to become more transparent about their
privacy practices. In line with social contract theory, transparency
enhances the relationship between firms and consumers as it ensures
a fair exchange of information (Culnan and Bies, 2003). Therefore,
transparency decreases the extent to which consumers feel their privacy
is violated (Martin et al., 2017), and makes consumers more willing to
disclose information (Son and Kim, 2008) or even purchase products
(Schlosser et al., 2006).
Social contract theory also suggests that firms could benefit long-
term when consumers consider them transparent due to enhanced trust
and commitment (Culnan and Bies, 2003). We suggest that trans-
parency could prevent future discontent with firms’ privacy practices,
as consumers know or could have known how their privacy was handled.
This shifts (part of) the responsibility for future privacy issues or the
locus of control from the firm to the consumer. Likewise, when firms
explain their privacy practices, consumers are less likely to regret giving
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permission to collect, store, or use their information, as it increases
the correspondence between consumers’ intentions and their behavior
(Zimmer et al., 2010). Future research should examine this (long-term)
effect more carefully, and assess whether and why consumers become
more committed and loyal to firms they consider transparent.
Hypothesis 7: Transparency about how consumers’ privacy is handled
diminishes future discontent with firms’ privacy practices.
5.2 Privacy statement and seal
To notify consumers about the collection, storage, and use of information
most firms post a privacy statement, which is a written overview of
their privacy practices generally available on their website. An issue
for firms is that consumers do not always take the effort to understand
how firms handle their privacy. Especially online or on mobile devices
consumers have to make many decisions within a short period of
time, and are faced with too much information about their privacy
(information overload), which makes it difficult to understand which
information is collected and stored, and how firms use this informa-
tion (Metzger, 2007). Moreover, some consumers consider privacy not
important enough to invest time in understanding a firm’s privacy
practices (Dinev et al., 2015). Therefore, rather than reading privacy
statements (Eurobarometer, 2011) consumers use them as a heuristic
instead. In line with signaling theory (Boulding and Kirmani, 1993)
prior studies have shown that the mere presence of a privacy statement
increases consumers’ trust in a firm (Aljukhadar et al., 2010), willingness
to disclose information (Xie et al., 2006; Hui et al., 2007; Wang et
al., 2004), and even willingness to purchase (Aljukhadar et al., 2010).
However, given that in most countries firms are required to post a
privacy statement, the actual differentiating effect on how consumers
behave is probably limited.
Likewise, firms post privacy seals, such as TRUSTe or BBBOnline,
to try and convince consumers that their privacy is secure. Although
some studies show that privacy seals give consumers the feeling that
firms are transparent (Rifon et al., 2005; Kim and Kim, 2011) and
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increase trust more than other objective trustmarks (Aiken and Boush,
2006), other studies show that the effect on consumers’ willingness to
disclose information is small (Wang et al., 2004) or absent, despite
consumers’ familiarity with the seal (Hui et al., 2007). Still, a more
recent study confirms that when choosing between firms consumers
opt for the firm with a privacy signal (e.g., a privacy icon, link to
privacy statement), even when that firm is more expensive (Tsai et al.,
2011).
5.3 Arousal of privacy concern
Another (related) reason why firms struggle with transparency is that
privacy is not always top-of-mind, especially online or when consumers
use mobile devices. Mentioning privacy, information collection, or other
“sensitive” terms, such as behavioral targeting or RFID, triggers con-
sumers’ privacy concerns. For example, respondents disclose less infor-
mation in surveys when privacy is mentioned (Acquisti et al., 2012),
and consumers are less willing to adopt a tracking system in a grocery
store when RFID is in the name (Smith et al., 2014). In fact, consumers
consider the negative outcomes (“information will be used against me”)
as more likely when firms explain both benefits and risks of information
disclosure (LaRose and Rifon, 2007), worry more about their privacy
when “data mining” is explained (Bolderdijk et al., 2013), and pointing
out a privacy policy on an online social network decreased consumers’
willingness to disclose their location (Knijnenburg et al., 2013).
Nevertheless, as firms are required to explain their privacy practices,
a better understanding how to handle the adverse effect of transparency
is essential. A solution could be that when firms trigger consumers’
privacy concern they need to convince consumers that they rigorously
protect privacy or that consumers have control over their information
(see Section 6). One possibility would be to make privacy statements
look strong, for example, by promising confidentiality and guaranteeing
protection against information theft (Schlosser et al., 2006). Similarly,
posting a privacy seal in addition to explaining the benefits and risks of
information collection reduces the perceived risks (LaRose and Rifon,
2007), as that also provides consumers some assurance.
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Hypothesis 8: Firms can resolve (part of) the issue of privacy arousal
by using signals in their communication about privacy that give con-
sumers the feeling they are protected.
5.4 Explaining the benefits
As also discussed in Section 4, regulatory focus theory suggests that
another solution for the issue of privacy arousal could be to stress the
benefits of information collection and use in order to direct consumers’
attention towards these benefits (Higgins, 1997). For example, when the
benefits of RFID are stressed consumers consider it more useful, while
stressing the negative side makes consumers more worried about their
privacy (Smith et al., 2014). Recently, several news outlets (e.g., Bild,
The Guardian, Forbes) have begun using pop-up announcements to
explain how the collection of information enables them to both supply
news for free and provide consumers with news that fits their needs.
Consumers feel less vulnerable when firms justify the use of personal
information (Aguirre et al., 2015), and this feeling of security increases
the click-through intention for personalized banner ads (Aguirre et al.,
2015) as well as for personalized mail (White et al., 2008). Likewise,
explaining the benefits of behavioral targeting to consumers increases the
acceptance and actual click-through of targeted banner ads (Schumann
et al., 2014).
However, if firms want transparency to be helpful they have to
understand when consumers take the effort to understand their explana-
tions of the benefits, and how to motivate consumers in case they take
little or no effort to understand these explanations. One easy solution
is to make privacy statements with the costs and benefits short and
easy to read (Pan and Zinkhan, 2006), rather than using very technical
or juridical language. Another possibility to make things easier for
consumers would be to explain privacy practices and the way consumers
benefit in short, easy-to-follow videos, as implemented by news outlet
The Guardian. Preliminary evidence suggests that posting a video could
enhance consumers’ trust in the firm and (indirectly) their intention
to transact with that firm (Aljukhadar et al., 2010). Furthermore,
firms could benefit from first explaining the negative consequences
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to consumers (e.g., information collection decreases your anonymity)
before explaining the positive consequences (e.g., you get a discount),
as that enhances consumers’ willingness to disclose information (White
et al., 2014).
Besides motivating consumers to invest time in understanding firms’
privacy practices firms also need to decide what they communicate.
Besides the aforementioned influence of the collection and storage of
information, firms need to understand which benefit(s) derived from
the use of information (see Section 4) consumers appreciate the most.
For example, when justifying the collection of personal information for
behavioral targeting, rather than stressing the increased relevance of
banner ads, firms are better off emphasizing that collection allows free
products or services (Schumann et al., 2014). Besides stressing the right
benefits, Martin et al. (2017) suggest that transparency only benefits
firms when they also provide consumers control.
Hypothesis 9: Firms can resolve (part of) the issue of privacy arousal
by stressing the (right) benefits to consumers.
6
Control
6.1 Effect on consumers
As for transparency, pressure from legislators and consumer protection
commissions has demanded that firms provide consumers control over
their information. Being focused on informed consent and providing
consumers the right to erasure, the European Union in particular intends
to give consumers more control over their own information (General
Data Protection Regulation (EU), 2016). Social contract theory suggests
that firms benefit from providing control, considering it is another
important requirement for a fair exchange of information between firms
and consumers (Culnan and Bies, 2003). When consumers believe a
firm provides control over (secondary) use they trust the firm more
(Mosteller and Poddar, 2017) and feel less vulnerable (Martin et al.,
2017). Therefore, consumers are more inclined to choose that firm
(Phelps et al., 2000; Hann et al., 2007), are more cooperative and
committed towards that firm (Son and Kim, 2008; Mosteller and Poddar,
2017), and are more willing to disclose (sensitive) information for a
personalized service (Mothersbaugh et al., 2012). Moreover, control
over the storage of information enhances the acceptance of behavioral
advertising (Schumann et al., 2014). On Facebook, the effectiveness
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of banner ads even increased after they made it easier for its users to
control their privacy (Tucker, 2014).
Although it has been shown convincingly that consumers are posi-
tively influenced by (perceived) control, future research should assess
why consumers become more cooperative and committed. Prior studies
have suggested that control provides consumers with a sense of autonomy,
which matters since consumers react negatively when they are confined
in their choices (Brehm, 1966). Related to this is that control might
make consumers feel less vulnerable (Martin et al., 2017) as it allows
consumers to revoke these choices whenever they please, making their
choices less consequential.
Hypothesis 10: Control over information makes consumers more
cooperative and committed, because (1) control provides them with a
sense of autonomy, and (2) it makes decisions less consequential.
6.2 Disruption of information collection
Despite the mounting legislative pressure, firms seems to remain reluc-
tant to provide control. Besides that providing control over information
could be technologically challenging, a negative consequence could be
that consumers might disrupt the collection, storage, or use of personal
information, which would prevent firms from taking full advantage of
customer intelligence and big data.
Preliminary evidence shows that consumers already become more
cooperative by a feeling of control over the use of information (Brandi-
marte et al., 2013). This seems to suggest that consumers are not so
much interested in disruption, but rather in having the ability to disrupt
in case this is needed. To the best of our knowledge, however, there
have been no recent studies on the extent to which consumers make use
of their ability to control the collection, storage, and use of information.
For example, while Facebook and Google (Android) have introduced
more options to control privacy (Norberg and Horne, 2014), they have
not published any statistics on how many consumers take advantage of
this control. Therefore, future research is much needed in this context.
For now, we can only conclude that consumers are expected to disrupt
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the collection, storage, and use of personal information when becoming
aware of the harmfulness of a firm’s privacy practices, such as selling
sensitive information to third parties, exceeds the benefits they offer.
6.3 Control over stored information
Besides increasing commitment and loyalty to a firm, providing control
could create another mutual benefit. Consumers are worried that firms’
databases contain errors (Smith et al., 1996), either because enriching
consumer profiles using inferences results in inaccuracies or due to
consumers providing erroneous information themselves. Firms can avoid
such issues by making information provision voluntary (Norberg and
Horne, 2014), and can also solve such issues by giving consumers access
to their personal information and allowing them to correct any potential
errors (Hann et al., 2007). As an example, Google increasingly allows
users to alter (improve) the profiles used for personalized advertisements
with regard to consumers’ interests and preferences.
6.4 Information disclosure as default
Another important issue for firms remains how they should provide
consumers with control. Offering an opt-out choice results in more
consumers consenting to provide information than an opt-in choice
(Johnson et al., 2002), while it has no effect on consumers’ purchase
likelihood (Eastlick et al., 2006). However, legislators tend to force a
choice of opting in rather than opting out. Besides legislative pressure,
firms also have to be aware that an opt-out choice, which essentially
makes information disclosure the default, results in more cases in which
they collect, store, and use information without consumers actively
consenting. While firms might benefit from this in the short term —
consumers initially consent — it could result in situations in which
information is collected against the will of the consumer, which might
affect consumers’ satisfaction and long-term commitment negatively.
As with transparency, control could prevent future discontent with
firms’ privacy practices as it shifts (part of) the responsibility for
future privacy issues to the consumer. If firms provide control over
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information, and consumers make no use of this control, consumers can
only blame themselves when firms’ privacy practices are not in line
with their preferences. In line with this reasoning, preliminary evidence
suggests that control in conjunction with transparency is most effective
in decreasing feelings of emotional violation and increasing trust, as well
as in decreasing the negative effect of a privacy breach (Martin et al.,
2017). Future research should examine in more detail how firms could
best provide control in a way that does not antagonize consumers.
Hypothesis 11: Firms that have information collection as the default
(e.g., use an opt-out choice for information collection) will suffer from




Consumers’ privacy preferences and expectations differ between contexts
(Nissenbaum, 2004; Martin and Nissenbaum, 2016b). Therefore, the
influence of privacy practices on consumers differs between industries
(or sectors). Privacy is a more pressing issue in industries that rely on
collecting a large amount of information or sensitive information, such
as healthcare providers or banking. Hence, all features that decrease
privacy concerns or increase trust are more important in fostering
consumers’ willingness to disclose information to, and more generally,
their willingness to interact or transact with firms from those industries
(Pan and Zinkhan, 2006; Bart et al., 2005).
Besides the sensitivity of information, consumers take into account
whether the information that is collected, stored, and used is congruent
with the products or services of a firm. Consumers are more willing to
disclose particulars when they anticipate they will be asked to disclose
that information (White et al., 2014). Thus, collecting sensitive specifics
is less of an issue when the information is congruent with the firm’s
products or services. For example, while consumers accept that financial
institutions will collect details about their income or mortgage they are
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reluctant to disclose their medical condition (Lwin et al., 2007; Martin
and Nissenbaum, 2016b).
Moreover, the industry (or sector) also moderates the influence
of security breaches, although these findings have not always been
consistent. While Acquisti and colleagues (2006) show that the effect on
firms is more severe for retail firms than for other firms (e.g., financial),
a more recent study provides evidence that the effect is stronger for
financial firms than for other firms (e.g., retail) (Malhotra and Kubowicz
Malhotra, 2011). Moreover, Cavusoglu and colleagues (2004) showed
earlier that the effect is more severe for online firms than for oﬄine
firms, most likely because for online firms there is more information
to be lost. While these findings are all focused on stock prices future
research should assess whether the direct influence of security breaches
on consumers also differs between industries.
7.2 Reputation
Besides the industry, several other firm characteristics influence con-
sumers. All characteristics of firms or websites that signal competence
and quality, in particular their reputation, motivate consumers to
disclose information (Schoenbachler and Gordon, 2002; Xie et al., 2006;
Aiken and Boush, 2006; Bart et al., 2005; Lwin et al., 2016).
Reputation also moderates the influence of firms’ privacy practices.
On the one hand, privacy statements are more effective for firms with a
strong reputation (Xie et al., 2006), as consumers have more confidence
in the credibility of these statements. On the other hand, transparency
is more crucial for firms with a weak reputation (Joinson et al., 2010).
More specifically, a lack of justification regarding the origin of the
information in personalized banner ads only makes consumers feel
vulnerable on untrustworthy websites, such as Facebook (Aguirre et al.,
2015). Likewise, as a strong reputation already convinces consumers
to accept information collection, providing a monetary compensation
becomes less effective or even ineffective in convincing consumers to
disclose information (Xie et al., 2006).
Besides signaling benevolence and integrity, the reputation of a
firm might also allude to competence and ability to provide consumers
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with valuable products and services (McKnight et al., 2002). Having
a reputation of competence may therefore enhance the influence of
the potential benefits of collection, storage, and use of information,
as consumers were more convinced that personalization is valuable
when it is provided by firms with a strong reputation (Bleier and
Eisenbeiss, 2015b). Future research should focus on providing a better
understanding how the influence of privacy practices on consumers is
moderated by firm characteristics.
8
Consumer Characteristics
8.1 General privacy concern
Consumers differ in the extent to which they value their privacy (Laufer
and Wolfe, 1977; Larson and Bell, 1988), implying that some consumers
worry more about their privacy in general than others. This differs
between generations, with older consumers being more concerned about
their privacy (Bellman et al., 2004; Goldfarb and Tucker, 2012). For
the recent generations Y and Z digitalization and the collection of
personal information has become part of everyday life, making them
less reluctant towards firms collecting and using information about
them. Future research should address how the change in generations
will impact the distinction between “real life” and “virtual life” and how
it affects the way consumers handle their privacy (see also Section 2.3).
Moreover, females (Bellman et al., 2004; Goldfarb and Tucker, 2012)
and consumers with less education (Milne and Boza, 1999) are generally
more apprehensive about their privacy, as are consumers who have
experienced a privacy violation (Bansal et al., 2015; Mosteller and
Poddar, 2017). Having experience with more channels or devices has
both been linked to higher (Sheehan and Hoy, 2000) and lower privacy
concern (Bellman et al., 2004). While experienced consumers are more
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aware of the risks (higher privacy concern), they also understand how to
protect against these risks (lower privacy concern). Future work should
explore the role of (digital) experience in more detail.
Evidently, consumers who worry more about their privacy in general
are less willing to disclose information (Premazzi et al., 2010; Zhao
et al., 2012) and more inclined to protect their privacy (Korzaan
and Boswell, 2008; Milne and Culnan, 2004). Moreover, they are less
receptive to products and services that rely on collecting personal
information, such as loyalty programs, CRM, and behavioral targeting
(Schumann et al., 2014; Ashley et al., 2011; Taylor et al., 2015; Awad
and Krishnan, 2006). Based on general privacy concern consumers
have been divided into three segments: privacy fundamentalists, pri-
vacy pragmatists, and those unconcerned about privacy (Westin, 1967;
Dolnicar and Jordaan, 2007; Hogan et al., 2002; Ackerman et al.,
1999; Kumaraguru and Cranor, 2005). However, segmenting consumers
based on (general) privacy concern is much disputed (Hoofnagle and
Urban, 2014; Martin and Nissenbaum, 2016a), as several context- and
situation-specific elements prevent these segments from accurately
differentiating how consumers behave (Acquisti and Grossklags, 2005b;
Urban and Hoofnagle, 2014; King, 2014). While an extensive discussion
on privacy segmentation is out of the scope of this paper, future research
should examine segmenting based on (general) privacy preferences more
thoroughly.
As general privacy concern reflects the importance of privacy
(involvement) for consumers (Bansal et al., 2015; Bansal et al., 2008),
it could also moderate the influence of firms’ privacy practices. The
(positive) influence of personalized service is weaker for consumers
who are highly concerned about their privacy (Shen and Dwayne
Ball, 2009), while the (negative) influence of information sensitivity is
stronger for these consumers (Mothersbaugh et al., 2012). Moreover,
highly involved consumers are more affected by transparency and other
privacy-protective features (Awad and Krishnan, 2006; Bansal et al.,
2008), although they are not convinced by weak privacy signals such as
privacy seals (Kim and Kim, 2011). Future research should assess in
more detail whether general privacy concern enhances or diminishes
the effect of privacy protective features.
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8.2 Innovativeness, propensity to trust, and personal
characteristics
Besides privacy concern, several other consumer-specific characteristics
affect how consumers deal with firms’ privacy practices. For example,
innovative consumers are more inclined to accept innovations than
others, also when these innovations are contingent on the collection and
use of information (Xu et al., 2009; Xu et al., 2011; Zhao et al., 2012).
In fact, innovative consumers are more receptive to firms collecting and
using their information in general (Mothersbaugh et al., 2012; Xu et al.,
2011). The same holds for consumers with a high propensity to trust
others (Malhotra et al., 2004; Mothersbaugh et al., 2012; Dinev and
Hart, 2006; Hui et al., 2007), as they are more convinced that firms will
not misuse or exploit their information (Aljukhadar et al., 2010; Kim
et al., 2009).
Furthermore, consumers’ personal circumstances affect the influence
of firms’ privacy practices. Whether a consumer considers information
to be sensitive may be based on his or her personal situation, with the
importance of keeping information away from firms dependent on the
extent to which a consumer believes he or she has something to hide.
For example, while most consumers are unwilling to disclose medical
information, a consumer in poor health may feel particularly strongly
about this issue (Bansal et al., 2010). A better understanding how
a consumer’s personal circumstances affect the influence of a firm’s
privacy practices would be highly valuable for firms.
8.3 Relationship with firm
Besides consumers’ personality and personal circumstances, also their
relationship with firms matters. Whether consumers trust a firm, and
thus accept information collection and use, revolves around their prior
experience with that firm (Schoenbachler and Gordon, 2002; Bansal
et al., 2015; Bart et al., 2005; Chellappa and Sin, 2005).
However, even though consumers are generally more willing to
disclose information to a firm they have a (long) relationship with,
they are less willing to disclose embarrassing information to these
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firms for fear of losing face (White, 2004). Moreover, offering monetary
compensation makes consumers with positive experiences with a firm
less inclined to disclose information (Premazzi et al., 2010). One reason
for this negative effect, which demands further investigation, could be
that providing monetary compensation makes information disclosure
more of a financial decision than a decision based on mutual trust.
Therefore, offering monetary compensation when consumers have had
positive prior experiences might give them the feeling that information




Privacy and privacy concern relate to cultural differences, as consumers
in individualistic countries worry more about their privacy (Milberg
et al., 2000), making perceived privacy and security (more) important
drivers for the perceived value of a website (Steenkamp and Geyskens,
2006). However, in a more recent study individualism has also been
linked to a lower privacy concern (Lowry et al., 2011). Therefore,
more insights on the influence of culture on privacy (concern) are
required.
Importantly, consumers from different countries and cultures worry
about different issues (Gurau and Ranchhod, 2009; Miltgen and Peyrat-
Guillard, 2014). For example, for US consumers unauthorized secondary
use is a minor issue, whereas for Singaporean consumers this is the most
important privacy violation when dealing with online retailers (Hann
et al., 2007). Since most knowledge is based on US-based samples, future
work should aim to include consumers from outside the United States




National differences are also reflected in legislation (Bellman et al.,
2004; Milberg et al., 2000). In countries for which the rule of law is
very formal and strict, privacy and security features are less important
drivers for the perceived value of a website (Steenkamp and Geyskens,
2006). Moreover, while US legislation is focused on letting firms and
consumers negotiate fairly over the collection, storage, and use of
personal information (Ohlhausen, 2014), the European Union has
become more protective over the past decade, as evidenced by the
upcoming General Data Protection Regulation. As these differences
affect firms’ potential to collect, store, and use information (Goldfarb
and Tucker, 2011b), focusing on consumers’ individual wishes is not
enough, as firms’ privacy practices should also be in line with national
laws (Nissenbaum, 2004). While discussing privacy legislation and its
influence on firms is out of scope, future research should carefully assess
how both current and future privacy legislation affect firms’ privacy
practices.
Consumers are not always aware how legislation protects their
privacy. Nevertheless, since consumers worry less when they believe
they are protected by the law, they become more willing to provide
information, less inclined to fabricate information, and less inclined to
actively protect their privacy (Lwin et al., 2007). Moreover, while it has
been suggested that the presence of legislation becomes less important
when firms provide control (Xu et al., 2009), another study suggests
the effect is the other way around — providing control becomes less
effective in the presence of legislation (Xu et al., 2012b). Future research
should examine this interplay between privacy legislation and control,
and its influence on consumers, in more detail.
9.3 Privacy-enhancing technologies
Consumers have recently begun taking matters in their own hands
by using privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) that offer options for
privacy, such as browser extensions and ad or cookie blockers. Even
when not all consumers have access to these technologies, we expect they
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will affect how privacy practices influence consumers. As an example,
giving consumers control would be less effective when consumers are
able to use PETs that provide them control over the collection, storage,
or use of information. While prior studies have assessed what determines
whether PETs are used (e.g., perceived ease-of-use, perceived usefulness)
(Xu et al., 2012a), understanding how these PETs affect firms and the
relationships with their customers remains an important area for future
research.
10
Summary and Directions for Future Research
As firms increasingly collect, store, and use information about consumers,
privacy concerns have surged. Given the importance of consumer infor-
mation to firms, understanding how privacy affects consumers is crucial.
Drawing on insights from various fields, we review relevant findings with
regard to the effect of firms’ privacy practices on consumers. Table 10.1
provides an overview of these findings. Table 10.2 describes how some
of these effects are moderated by differences between firms, consumers,
and environments.
On the basis of this review, we have formulated several hypotheses
with regard to the influence of firms’ privacy practices that should
provide direction for future research. On a more general level, more
research should be devoted to how consumers trade off the negative and
positive consequences of information disclosure (the privacy calculus)
in specific contexts, and in which circumstances consumers behave in
accordance with this tradeoff. Future research should (1) identify the
negative and positive consequences of information collection, storage,
and use, (2) assess the extent to which consumers are aware of these
consequences, (3) reveal the impact of these consequences, and (4) use
field studies to link these consequences to relevant behavioral outcomes,
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Table 10.1: Current knowledge about consumer privacy (main effects).
Topic Findings Main papers
Information
collection
— Consumers are less inclined to disclose
information when firms request more
(sensitive) information
— Consumers are more inclined to accept
information collection by computers than
humans (e.g., employers)
— Consumers are more inclined to disclose
information when they receive monetary
compensation, although this response
depends on the type of information and the
amount of compensation
— Consumers are more inclined to disclose
information when firms disclose information
first, when privacy (concern) is not

















— Consumers worry that unknown outsiders
may get access to their personal information
— Privacy breaches, both the firm’s own and









— Consumers are affected less when
information is used at an aggregated level
— Consumers value personalization less when
it demands they have to provide additional
information or when it is based on sensitive
information
— Consumers click (and buy) more when
banner ads and direct mail are personalized,
unless these ads or mails arouse privacy
concerns by making it obvious that firms
collect, store, and use consumers’
information
— Consumers are less committed and loyal to















(2009), Xie et al.
(2006), Xu et al.






Topic Findings Main papers
Transparency — Consumers are more committed and
cooperative towards transparent firms
— Consumers do not always take the time to
understand how firms handle their privacy,
and use privacy statements (and seals) as
heuristics instead
— Consumers do not always think about
privacy, which is why privacy statements (or
other sensitive terms) can arouse consumers’
privacy concerns
— Consumers are more inclined to accept
information collection, storage, and use













et al. (2011), and
Wirtz and Lwin
(2009)
Control — Consumers are more inclined to choose a
firm, disclose sensitive information, or
accept personalized ads when (they believe)
firms provide control over the collection,
storage, and use of information
— Consumers accept information collection
more often when firms make information











ranging from accepting information collection to churn and word of
mouth. Except for some recent studies on online advertising, most
findings are based on scenarios and intentions rather than actual
behavior. Linking consumers’ privacy calculus or their intentions to
actual behavior should also result in a better understanding of when
and why the privacy paradox occurs or whether it is due to inherently
inconsistent consumer behavior.
Besides being challenged by the collection, storage, and use of
personal information, increasing regulatory and technological pressure
forces firms to better understand the role of transparency and control.
Although one could debate whether informed consent works in practice
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Table 10.2: Current knowledge about consumer privacy (moderators).
Moderator Findings Main papers
Firm — The effect of privacy-protective and
-invasive features on consumers is more
pronounced in industries that rely on
collecting sensitive information
— The effect of information sensitivity is less
pronounced when the information is
congruent with the firm’s products and
services
— The effect of monetary compensation on
consumers is weaker (or absent) for firms
with a strong reputation
Aguirre et al. (2015),
Bart et al. (2005),




Consumer — The effect of information sensitivity and
privacy-protective features (e.g.,
transparency) is more pronounced for
consumers with a high general privacy
concern
— The effect of the benefits of data-driven
innovations is stronger for consumers high
on innovativeness
— The effect of monetary compensation on
consumers’ willingness to disclose
information is weaker (or absent) when
consumers already have a relationship with
a firm
Bansal et al. (2015),





(2004), Xu et al.
(2009), Xu et al.
(2011), and Zhao
et al. (2012)
Environment — The effect of privacy-protective and
privacy-invasive features on consumers
depends on cultural differences
— The effect of control on consumers is less
pronounced in countries with strong privacy
legislation or in the presence of
privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs)
Hann et al. (2007),
Lwin et al. (2007),
Steenkamp and
Geyskens (2006),
Xu et al. (2009), Xu
et al. (2011), and
Zhao et al. (2012)
(Landau, 2015; Nissenbaum, 2015), it appears to remain the main
focus of legislators, both in the United States and the European Union.
Therefore, future research should provide insights into (1) the extent
to which transparency and control affect actual consumer behavior, (2)
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in which situations and for which firms and consumers transparency
and control are crucial, (3) in which form firms should provide trans-
parency and control, and (4) the long-term consequences of providing
transparency and control. Game-theoretic models suggest that proactive
privacy protection is a viable business model (Lee et al., 2011). However,
given the drawbacks of transparency and control, it remains to be seen
whether this also works in practice.
Finally, future research should focus on the differences between
consumers and environments. Younger generations seem less concerned
about the collection of information, which might have a profound influ-
ence on the way consumers handle their privacy. Another issue is that
most studies so far have used student samples from the United States
to show how firms’ privacy practices affect consumers. However, given
the differences between generations — for example, older consumers are
more concerned — these findings might not be generalizable. Likewise,
given that cultural differences exist with regard to privacy — for example,
loss of face is more important in Asian culture — cross-cultural studies
need to assess how these differences moderate the effect of firms’ privacy
practices on consumers.
10.1 Managerial implications
On the basis of current knowledge summarized in Tables 2 and 3, we
identify five important managerial implications for firms. First, firms
must exercise caution about what information they collect and how.
Consumers are not only hesitant to disclose sensitive information, such
as financial or medical information, but are less responsive to monetary
compensation or any other means to convince them to accept information
collection. Moreover, while collecting information automatically is more
convenient for consumers, these same consumers might also consider it
as unfair.
Second, firms should make sure that their information storage is
secure. Security breaches reduce firm value (i.e., stock prices), and by
damaging a firm’s reputation it might also hurt firms in the long run. In
addition to preventing security breaches, firms could attempt to decrease
the negative impact of any security breach, for example, by being
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transparent in their communication and providing control via adequate
channels. Also anonymization of stored information could decrease the
risks for consumers, although this only helps when consumers understand
that anonymization puts them less at risk.
Third, firms should be aware that the acceptance of profiling and
personalization depends on which and how much information is used.
Employing personal information in personalized banner ads or direct
mailings could trigger privacy concern (and reactance), which could
reduce the effectiveness of these ads or mailings. Yet, firms should also
be aware of how the use of information, in particular for personalization,
could provide consumers with the convenience of receiving (relevant)
content at the right time and location. Overall, a thorough understanding
of the benefits and costs of information use for personalization and
other purposes is essential for firms.
Fourth, although firms should ensure that they handle privacy
honestly, firms have to take into account that transparency — that is,
communicating about privacy — triggers privacy concerns. Therefore,
firms should only mention privacy when consumers have an actual
privacy decision to make (e.g., whether to allow information collection),
as transparency works best in concurrence with control. Moreover,
rather than (only) convincing consumers they are not at risk, firms
should be transparent about how the collection, storage, and use of
information benefits consumers.
Finally, for all of these implications holds that firms have to take
into account that the influence of privacy practices differs between
firms, consumers, and environments. In particular, firms have to be
aware that privacy is a more pressing issue in industries that handle
either a lot of information or sensitive information. Moreover, firms
should realize that some consumers value their privacy more than
others, which affects whether they accept information collection, and
therefore also the adoption of data-driven products and services. In
understanding consumer behavior, it is important to take into account




Consumer informational privacy affects firms on the strategic and
operational levels regarding product management (e.g., personalization),
distribution (e.g., location-based services), pricing (e.g., monetary bene-
fits for providing information), and communication (e.g., transparency).
In recent years, collecting information about consumers has become
crucial for firms. However, as the growing collection of information
has triggered consumers’ privacy concerns, understanding how privacy
affects consumers has shifted from being a minor issue to being an area
in great need of more insights. By summarizing current knowledge and
formulating hypotheses about the influence of firms’ privacy practices,
we provide direction to future research. Although the concept of privacy
has changed and will change over time, it will remain an important
issue for many years to come.
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